China has accused the Netherlands of prolonging a chip war that risks halting car factories worldwide, escalating a dispute over blocked investments and export controls that reaches deep into the global semiconductor supply chain. The clash, centered on the Dutch government’s decision to stop Nexperia’s acquisition of a chip plant and on restrictions affecting ASML’s high-end lithography tools, is now rippling through production lines from Europe to Asia. On November 13, 2025, the Dutch minister at the heart of the conflict reaffirmed her stance with the statement “I’d do it all again,” signaling no retreat even as automakers warn of mounting economic fallout.
Origins of the Netherlands-China Chip Dispute
The current confrontation traces back to the Dutch government’s 2022 decision to block Nexperia’s acquisition of a British chip factory, a move justified in The Hague as necessary to protect national security in critical semiconductor supply chains. Officials argued that allowing a company with Chinese ownership to take control of a strategically important plant would expose Europe’s electronics and automotive sectors to political leverage at a time when chips were already in short supply. That intervention, which directly affected a facility producing components used in engine control units and power management systems, signaled that the Netherlands was prepared to sacrifice investment inflows to keep sensitive manufacturing capacity out of Beijing’s orbit.
ASML, the Dutch firm that produces advanced lithography machines essential for chip manufacturing, quickly became another focal point in the dispute as export restrictions to China tightened from 2019 onward. Dutch authorities, coordinating with allies, limited shipments of ASML’s most sophisticated equipment to Chinese customers, a step Beijing framed as a deliberate attempt to slow its technological rise. Chinese officials argued that the combination of the Nexperia block and curbs on ASML’s exports amounted to a pattern of unfair trade practices, and by 2023 they had lodged formal complaints at the World Trade Organization that cast the Netherlands as part of a broader United States led effort to contain China’s semiconductor ambitions. For global manufacturers that depend on a steady flow of chips, the early stages of this dispute already hinted at a future in which geopolitical decisions could dictate which factories stayed open.
Escalation and Accusations in Late 2025
Tensions sharpened further in late 2025 when Beijing publicly accused the Netherlands of “prolonging the chip war” through sustained export controls and investment blocks that, in China’s view, no longer had any plausible justification beyond strategic pressure. Chinese ministries linked these policies directly to delays in automotive semiconductor deliveries, arguing that Dutch decisions were now constraining supplies of microcontrollers and power chips needed for everything from anti lock braking systems to battery management units. The rhetoric marked a shift from earlier, more technical complaints about licensing rules to a narrative that placed the Netherlands at the center of a looming crisis for the global car industry.
Recent statements from Chinese officials have also emphasized the immediacy of the threat, warning that shortages triggered by the dispute could force assembly lines to shut down rather than simply slow production. Unlike prior diplomatic notes that focused on long term competitiveness, the latest accusations highlight explicit risks of factory stoppages, with Chinese representatives citing delayed shipments to plants in both Europe and Asia. European carmakers such as Volkswagen and Stellantis have reported that chip bottlenecks tied to the Dutch Chinese standoff are now being factored into contingency plans for factories in Germany and Italy, where models like the Volkswagen Golf and the Fiat 500e rely on just in time deliveries of specialized semiconductors. The prospect of halted shifts and furloughed workers underscores how a policy fight over export licenses has evolved into a direct threat to jobs and output across multiple continents.
Dutch Stance and Global Industry Fallout
Inside the Netherlands, the government has shown little sign of backing down, even as Beijing’s criticism has intensified. The Dutch minister responsible for the Nexperia block, identified in reporting as the key figure in the car chip standoff with China, reiterated on November 13, 2025 that “I’d do it all again,” a line that encapsulated her insistence that security concerns must outweigh short term trade concessions. That declaration, delivered after months of pressure from Chinese counterparts and lobbying by affected companies, signaled to both allies and adversaries that The Hague views control over semiconductor assets as a core element of national resilience. For Dutch policymakers, the risk of over dependence on Chinese linked chip production is seen as more dangerous than the immediate economic costs of strained relations.
The global car industry is already counting those costs, with projections of up to 20% production cuts in 2026 if the standoff persists and chip flows remain constrained. Analysts warn that European manufacturers will not be the only ones hit, as U.S. and Japanese automakers that source components from suppliers tied into Dutch Chinese trade routes also face ripple effects. Companies building high volume models such as the Ford F 150, the Toyota Corolla and the Nissan Qashqai are preparing for renewed shortages of the same types of chips that crippled output during the pandemic, only this time driven by policy rather than purely by demand shocks. Ongoing EU level talks in Brussels are exploring whether a unified framework for chip export policies could ease tensions, but the Netherlands has pushed for rules that preserve its ability to block deals like Nexperia’s, while China has called for direct bilateral negotiations to prevent what it describes as broader economic decoupling. The gap between those positions leaves carmakers, suppliers and workers exposed to a prolonged period of uncertainty in which political decisions in The Hague and Beijing may determine how many vehicles roll off production lines in 2026 and beyond.